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Abstract We consider cooperative transferable utility games, or simply TU-games,
with limited communication structure in which players can cooperate if and only if
they are connected in the communication graph. Solutions for such graph games can
be obtained by applying standard solutions to a modified or restricted game that takes
account of the cooperation restrictions. We discuss Harsanyi solutions which distrib-
ute dividends such that the dividend shares of players in a coalition are based on power
measures for nodes in corresponding communication graphs. We provide axiomatic
characterizations of the Harsanyi power solutions on the class of cycle-free graph
games and on the class of all graph games. Special attention is given to the Harsanyi
degree solution which equals the Shapley value on the class of complete graph games
and equals the position value on the class of cycle-free graph games. The Myerson
value is the Harsanyi power solution that is based on the equal power measure. Finally,
various applications are discussed.
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1 Introduction
A situation in which a finite set of players can obtain certain payoffs by cooperation
can be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-
game, being a pair (N , v), where N ⊂ IN is a finite set of players and v : 2N → IR is a
characteristic function on N such that v(∅) = 0. For any coalition S ⊆ N , v(S) is the
worth of coalition S, i.e., the members of coalition S can obtain a total payoff of v(S)
by agreeing to cooperate. Unless stated otherwise, we assume that N = {1, . . . , n} and
we denote a TU-game (N , v) shortly by its characteristic function v.
A payoff vector x ∈ IRn of a game v is an n-dimensional vector giving a payoff
xi ∈ IR to any player i ∈ N . A payoff vector x is efficient if it exactly distributes
the worth v(N ) of the ‘grand coalition’ N , i.e.,
∑
i∈N xi = v(N ). A (single-valued)
solution for TU-games is a function f that assigns to every game v a payoff vector
f (v) ∈ IRn . A solution f is efficient if f (v) is efficient for any game v.
In its classical interpretation, a TU-game describes a situation in which the players
in every coalition S of N can cooperate to form a feasible coalition and earn the worth
v(S). However, one can add certain restrictions on cooperation. One of the best-known
restrictions are the games with limited communication structure in which the members
of some coalition S can realize the worth v(S) if and only if they are connected within
a given communication graph on the set of players. These graph-restricted games
were first studied in Myerson (1977). Solutions for graph-restricted games usually
correspond to modified classical solutions for cooperative games.
In this paper we introduce Harsanyi power solutions for (communication) graph
restricted games which are based on Harsanyi solutions for TU-games. These Hars-
anyi solutions are proposed as solutions for TU-games in Vasil’ev (1982, 2003) (see
also Derks et al. 2000, where a Harsanyi solution is called a sharing value). The idea
behind a Harsanyi solution is that it distributes the Harsanyi dividends (see Harsanyi
1959) over the players in the corresponding coalitions according to a chosen sharing
system which assigns to every coalition S a sharing vector specifying for every player
in S its share in the dividend of S. The payoff to each player i is thus equal to the
sum of its shares in the dividends of all coalitions of which he is a member. A famous
Harsanyi solution is the Shapley value (1953) which distributes the dividend of each
coalition equally among the players in that coalition. The novelty of the Harsanyi
power solutions for graph restricted games is that we associate sharing systems with
some power measure for the underlying communication graph, this measure being a
function which assigns a nonnegative real number to every node in the graph. These
numbers represent the strength or power of those nodes in the graph. Given a power
measure we define the corresponding sharing system such that the share vectors for
every coalition are proportional to the power measure of the corresponding subgraph.
Out of a large variety of possible power measures (and corresponding power solu-
tions), we give special attention to the degree measure that assigns to every player in a
communication graph the number of players with whom he is directly connected. We
show that on the class of cycle-free graph games, the corresponding Harsanyi power
solution is equal to the position value, introduced in Borm et al. (1992), while it equals
the Shapley value on the class of complete graph games.
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Applying the equal power measure, which assigns equal power to all players, we
obtain the Myerson value as introduced in Myerson (1977) as the corresponding Hars-
anyi power solution. After weakening some of the axioms used in Borm et al. (1992) to
characterize the position- and Myerson value on the class of cycle-free graph games,
we generalize these axioms to obtain axiomatic characterizations of all Harsanyi power
solutions. It turns out that one of the axioms is not satisfied on the class of all graph
games. By replacing this axiom by two invariance axioms, we also obtain an axiomatic
characterization on the class of all graph games. Finally we discuss some applications,
in particular assignment games, ATM-games and auction games.
The underlying paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is a preliminary section
defining cooperative TU-games, notions in graph theory, power measures on graphs
and solutions for graph games. In Sect. 3 we introduce the concept of Harsanyi power
solution and discuss several of its properties. In Sect. 4 we give axiomatic charac-
terizations of the Harsanyi power solutions. In Sect. 5 we discuss applications, while
Sect. 6 concludes. The appendix shows the logical independence of the axioms.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Cooperative TU-games
A game v is monotone if v(S) ≤ v(T ) for all S ⊆ T ⊆ N . It is convex if v(S ∪ T ) +
v(S ∩ T ) ≥ v(S) + v(T ) for all S, T ⊆ N . Throughout the paper we assume that any
game is zero-normalized, i.e., v({i}) = 0 for all i ∈ N . We denote the collection of all
zero-normalized games on player set N by GN , and the collection of all non-empty
subsets of N by N . A special class of monotone and convex games are unanimity
games. For each T ⊆ N , the unanimity game uT is given by uT (S) = 1 if T ⊆ S, and
uT (S) = 0 otherwise. It is well-known that the unanimity games uT , T ∈ N , form
a basis for GN and that for each game v ∈ GN we have that v = ∑T∈N v(T )uT ,
where the coefficients v(T ) are the Harsanyi dividends, see Harsanyi (1959). By
applying the Möbius transformation we obtain that
v(S) =
∑
T⊆S
(−1)|S|−|T |v(T ), S ∈ N .
Observe that for every i,v({i}) = v({i}) and thus v({i}) = 0, v ∈ GN , because
every v in GN is zero-normalized.
In this paper we consider so-called Harsanyi solutions, proposed by Vasil’ev (1982)
(see also Vasil’ev 2003) and applied recently by van den Brink et al. (2007) to the
class of line-graph games. First, a sharing system on N is a system p = (pS)S∈N ,
where pS is an |S|-dimensional vector assigning a nonnegative share pSi ≥ 0 to every
player i ∈ S with ∑ j∈S pSj = 1, S ∈ N . We denote the collection of all sharing
systems on N by P N . For a game v and sharing system p ∈ P N , the corresponding
Harsanyi payoff vector is the payoff vector h p(v) ∈ IRn given by
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h pi (v) =
∑
S∈N ,i∈S
pSi v(S), i ∈ N ,
i.e., the payoff h pi (v) to player i ∈ N is the sum over all coalitions S ∈ N , containing
i , of the share pSi v(S) of player i in the Harsanyi dividend of coalition S. A Hars-
anyi solution on GN assigns for a given sharing system p ∈ P N the Harsanyi payoff
vector h p(v) to each game v. Due to the equality v(N ) = ∑S∈N v(S), we have∑
i∈N h
p
i (v) = v(N ), and thus each Harsanyi solution is efficient. The Shapley value
is the Harsanyi solution that assigns to any game v the Harsanyi payoff vector h p(v)
with the sharing system p given by pSi = 1|S| , S ∈ N , i ∈ S. Throughout the paper
we denote the Shapley value of game v by Sh(v).
2.2 Notions in graph theory
An undirected graph is a pair (N , L) where N is the set of nodes1 and L ⊆ {{i, j}|i, j ∈
N , i = j} is a collection of edges or links. For {i, j} ∈ L , the nodes i and j are said
to be adjacent (neighboring) to each other and incident to link {i, j}. The set of nodes
adjacent to i in graph (N , L) is called the neighborhood of i , and it is denoted by
R(N ,L)(i) = { j ∈ N\{i} | {i, j} ∈ L}. The number of nodes in R(N ,L)(i) is the degree
of node i in (N , L). For graph (N , L) the degree vector d(N , L) ∈ IRn is given by
di (N , L) = |R(N ,L)(i)|, i ∈ N . The set D(N , L) = {i ∈ N | R(N ,L)(i) = ∅} is the
set of non-isolated nodes in (N , L). The complete graph on N is the graph (N , Lc)
with Lc = {{i, j} | i, j ∈ N , i = j}. A sequence of k different nodes (i1, . . . , ik)
is a path in (N , L) if {ih, ih+1} ∈ L for h = 1, . . . , k − 1. A sequence of nodes
(i1, . . . , ik+1) is a cycle in (N , L) if k ≥ 3, (i1, . . . , ik) is a path, {ik, ik+1} ∈ L and
ik+1 = i1. A graph (N , L) is cycle-free when it does not contain any cycle. We denote
the class of all possible sets of links L on N by LN . The subclass of sets L such that
(N , L) is cycle-free is denoted by LNC F .
Two nodes i, j ∈ N are connected in graph (N , L) if there exists a path (i1, . . . , ik)
with i1 = i and ik = j . A graph (N , L) is connected if any two nodes i, j ∈ N are con-
nected. For some K ⊆ N , the graph (K , L(K )) with L(K )={l ∈ L|l ⊆ K } is called
a subgraph of (N , L). The notions of degree and neighborhood are straightforwardly
extended to subgraphs. For given graph (N , L), a set of nodes K is a connected subset
of N when the subgraph (K , L(K )) is connected. A subset K of N is a component
in (N , L) if the subgraph (K , L(K )) is maximally connected, i.e., (K , L(K )) is con-
nected and for any j ∈ N\K , the subgraph (K ∪ { j}, L(K ∪ { j})) is not connected.
Clearly, for any graph (N , L), the collection of components forms a unique partition
of N . For K ⊆ N , we denote by C(K ) the set of all components in the subgraph
(K , L(K )). Notice that a component of the subgraph (K , L(K )) need not be a com-
ponent of (N , L). For more notions on communication graphs and general graphs we
refer to, respectively, van den Nouweland (1993) and Harary (1969).
1 Since in this paper the nodes in a graph represent the players in a game we use the same notation for the
set of nodes as the set of players.
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2.3 Power measures
A power measure is a function σ that assigns to any graph (S, L), S ⊆ N , a nonneg-
ative vector σ(S, L) ∈ IR|S|+ , yielding the nonnegative power σi (S, L) of node i ∈ S
in the graph (S, L). A power measure is symmetric if for any graph (S, L), S ⊆ N ,
and i, j ∈ S such that R(S,L)(i)\{ j} = R(S,L)( j)\{i}, we have σi (S, L) = σ j (S, L).
It is positive if for any (S, L), the power of node i is positive if and only if i is non-
isolated (and thus node i has zero power if it is isolated). Throughout this paper we
only consider symmetric and positive power measures. Some examples of such power
measures are the following.2
1. A straightforward power measure is the degree measure d, which assigns to any
graph (S, L), S ∈ N , the degree vector d(S, L).
2. The β − measure is given by βi (S, L) = ∑ j∈R(S,L)(i) 1|R(S,L)( j)| , i ∈ S, S ∈ N ,
i.e., any node i receives an amount 1|R(S,L)( j)| of power from every neighbour j (if
any).3
3. The positional power measure is given by δi (S, L(S)) = |R(S,L)(i)| +
1
|S|
∑
j∈R(S,L)(i) δ j (S, L), i ∈ S, S ∈ N , i.e., the positional power of node i
is equal to the number of neighbours of i plus a fraction 1|S| of the total power of
its neighbours.4
4. The equal power measure is given by γi (S, L) = 1 if i ∈ D(S, L) and γi (S, L)
= 0, otherwise, S ∈ N .5
2.4 Graph games and solutions
We assume that there is a communication structure on the player set N represented
by an undirected graph (N , L), with N as the set of nodes and L as the set of (binary
communication) links on N . A game v with communication graph (N , L) is shortly
denoted by (v, L) and referred to as a graph game. A (single-valued) solution for graph
games is a function f that assigns a payoff vector f (v, L) ∈ IRn to any graph game
(v, L).
In the graph game (v, L) a coalition S ∈ N can realize its worth v(S) if and
only if (S, L (S)) is a connected subgraph of (N , L). Whenever this is not the case,
players in S can only realize the sum of the worths of the components of (S, L(S)).
2 Other examples are the so-called centrality measures as considered in e.g. Gómez et al. (2003) and
Monsuur and Storcken (2002).
3 This measure is introduced in van den Brink and Gilles (2000) for directed graphs, and applied to undi-
rected graphs in van den Brink et al. (2008).
4 Despite its name, the positional power measure is not related to the position value. This measure is intro-
duced in Herings et al. (2005) for directed graphs. For S ∈ N , this power measure requires to solve an
|S|-dimensional system of equations. In Herings et al. (2005) it is shown that the measure is well-defined,
i.e., the system of equations has a unique solution with positive numbers for non-isolated nodes and zero
power for isolated nodes.
5 The more common definition is γ i (S, L)=1, i ∈ S, S ∈ N , but this measure is not positive.
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As introduced by Myerson (1977), this yields the restricted game vL given by
vL(S) =
∑
T∈C(S)
v(T ), S ⊆ N .
It is well-known that in the restricted game any unconnected coalition has zero divi-
dend, see for instance Owen (1986), Hamiache (1999) or Bilbao (1998). Borm et al.
(1992) refer to the restricted game vL as the point game corresponding to (v, L). They
also introduce the link game (L , r L ). Its set of players is the set of links L and its
characteristic function is given by
r L(E) = vE (N ) for all E ⊆ L ,
i.e., for every subset E ⊆ L of links, the worth of E is what the ‘grand coalition’ N
earns in game (N , v) when E is the set of communication links.6 Two well-known solu-
tions for graph games are the Myerson value and the position value. The Myerson value
(Myerson 1977) of (v, L), denoted by μ(v, L), is given by μ(v, L) = Sh(vL), i.e., the
Myerson value assigns to every graph game (v, L) the Shapley value of the restricted
game vL . The position value (see Borm et al. 1992) of (v, L), denoted by π(v, L), is
given by πi (v, L) = ∑l∈Li 12 Shl(L , r L), i ∈ N , where Li = {l ∈ L | i ∈ l}. So, first,
the Shapley value of the link game (L , r L ) is determined and then the Shapley value
of each link is distributed equally among the nodes incident to it.
For ease of notation, in the sequel we denote for some E ⊆ L and l ∈ L , the sets
E ∪ {l} and E\{l} by E ∪ l and E\l, respectively. In Borm et al. (1992) a character-
ization is given for both the Myerson- and the position value on the class of cycle-free
graph games. To give the axioms we need the following three notions. First, link
l ∈ L is superfluous in (v, L) if vE (N ) = vE∪l(N ) for all E ⊆ L . Second, graph
game (v, L) is link anonymous if there exists a function gL : {0, 1, . . . , |L|} → IR
such that r L(E) = gL(|E |) for all E ⊆ L . Graph game (v, L) is link unanimous if
r L = vL(N )uL , i.e., (v, L) is link anonymous with gL(|L|) = vL(N ) and gL(k) = 0
for k < |L|. Third, graph game (v, L) is point anonymous if there exists a function
gP : {1, . . . , |D(N , L)|} → IR such that vL(S) = gP(|S ∩ D(N , L)|), S ⊆ N . Graph
game (v, L) is point unanimous if vL = vL(N )u D(N ,L), i.e., it is point anonymous
with gP(|D(N , L)|) = vL(N ) and gP(k) = 0 for k < |D(N , L)|. We now state the
following five axioms for a solution f on the class of graph games on N .
Component efficiency For every graph game (v, L) and every component S in (N , L),
we have
∑
i∈S fi (v, L) = v(S).
Additivity For every pair of graph games (v, L), (w, L), we have7 f (v + w, L) =
f (v, L) + f (w, L).
Superfluous link property If l ∈ L is a superfluous link in graph game (v, L), then
f (v, L) = f (v, L\l).
6 In Borm et al. (1992) this game is called the arc game. Here we follow Slikker (2005) and call this game
the link game.
7 For two games v,w ∈ GN the sum game is defined by (v + w)(S) = v(S) + w(S) for all S ⊆ N .
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Degree measure property If graph game (v, L) is link unanimous, then there is
α ∈ IR such that f (v, L) = αd(N , L).
Communication ability property If graph game (v, L) is point unanimous, then
there is α ∈ IR such that fi (v, L) = α for all i ∈ D(N , L), and fi (v, L) = 0 for every
i ∈ N\D(N , L).
For the proof of the following results, we refer to Borm et al. (1992).
Proposition 2.1
(i) The position value satisfies component efficiency, additivity, the superfluous link
property and the degree measure property on the class of all graph games. More-
over, on the class of cycle-free graph games it is the unique solution satisfying
these four properties.
(ii) The Myerson value satisfies component efficiency, additivity, the superfluous link
property and the communication ability property on the class of all graph games.
Moreover, on the class of cycle-free graph games it is the unique solution satisfying
these four properties.
Observe that the position value does not satisfy the communication ability property
and that the Myerson value does not satisfy the degree measure property. It should
be noticed that the proofs given in Borm et al. (1992) use stronger versions of the
degree measure property and the communication ability property by requiring that
these properties hold for any link anonymous, respectively point anonymous graph
game. These stronger properties hold on the class of all graph games, but the weaker
properties as defined above are enough to prove the characterization statements of
Proposition 2.1 on the class of cycle-free graph games.
3 Harsanyi power solutions
Given a positive power measure σ we define the corresponding Harsanyi power solu-
tion, denoted by ϕσ , on the class of all graph games on player set N by
ϕσ (v, L) = h p(σ )(vL)
with sharing system p(σ ) = (pS(σ ))S∈N given by
pSi (σ ) =
σi (S, L(S))
∑
j∈S σ j (S, L(S))
, for all i ∈ S whenever
∑
j∈S
σ j (S, L(S)) = 0,
and pSi (σ ) = 1|S| for all i ∈ S whenever
∑
j∈S σ j (S, L(S)) = 0. So, the Hars-
anyi power solution assigns to each graph game (v, L) the Harsanyi solution of the
corresponding restricted game vL with the sharing system p(σ ) determined by the
power measure σ such that the distribution of any dividend vL (S) of coalition S in
the restricted game vL is proportional to the powers of the players in the subgraph
(S, L(S)). Observe that the shares do not matter when all powers are zero, because that
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can only happen when all players of S are isolated in (S, L(S)), and thus the dividend
of S in vL is equal to zero. We call the Harsanyi power solution the Harsanyi degree
solution, denoted by ϕd , if we take the degree measure d to distribute the dividends.
Example 3.1 Consider the graph game (v, L) on N = {1, 2, 3, 4} given by v = u{1,2,3}
and L = {{1, 2}, {1, 3}, {1, 4}, {2, 4}}. The payoffs assigned to this graph game by the
position value, the Myerson value and the Harsanyi degree solution, respectively, are
π(v, L) = 1
24
(11, 4, 7, 2), μ(v, L) = 1
3
(1, 1, 1, 0) and ϕd(v, L) = 1
4
(2, 1, 1, 0).
This graph game is taken from Borm et al. (1992), Example 6.1, who use it to motivate
the position value compared to the Myerson value. The position value and the Hars-
anyi degree solution have in common that they reward player 1 for having a ‘central’
position in the communication graph by giving player 1 a higher payoff than players
2 and 3. The Myerson value assigns the players in the unanimity coalition {1, 2, 3}
equal payoffs. The Harsanyi degree solution and the Myerson value have in common
that they both assign zero payoff to player 4. Observe that 4 is a null player in the
game v and is not needed to connect the players in the unanimity coalition {1, 2, 3}.
However, the links {1, 4} and {2, 4} are not superfluous, which is why player 4 gets a
positive payoff in the position value. unionsq
Clearly, when we take the equal power measure γ , the corresponding Harsanyi
power solution distributes all (nonzero) dividends of the restricted game vL equally
among the players of the coalitions.
Corollary 3.2 For every graph game (v, L) on N , ϕγ (v, L) = μ(v, L).
In case the power measure is symmetric, the corresponding Harsanyi power solution
ϕσ extends the Shapley value to the class of graph games in the sense that it yields the
Shapley value of game v whenever the graph is complete.
Proposition 3.3 For a symmetric positive power measure σ, ϕσ (v, Lc) = Sh(v) for
all v ∈ GN .
Proof If σ is symmetric then σi (S,Lc(S))∑
j∈S σ j (S,Lc(S))
= 1|S| for all i ∈ S ⊆ N . Moreover,
v(S) = vLc (S) for all S ∈ N . Thusϕσi (v, Lc)=
∑
{S⊆N |i∈S}
σi (S,Lc(S))∑
j∈S σ j (S,Lc(S))
vLc
(S)=∑{S⊆N |i∈S} 1|S|v(S) = Shi (v) for all i ∈ N . unionsq
In the remainder of this section we state several properties of Harsanyi power solu-
tions. To do so, we first generalize the communication ability property to the class of
positive power measures.
σ -Communication ability property If (v, L) is point unanimous, then there is α ∈ IR
such that f (v, L) = ασ(N , L).
Observe that the σ -communication ability property reduces to the communication
ability property when we take the equal power measure σ = γ . We now have the
following proposition.
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Proposition 3.4 For a positive power measure σ , the Harsanyi power solution ϕσ
satisfies component efficiency, additivity and the σ -communication ability property
on the class of all graph games.
Proof Since vL (S) = 0 if S is not connected in (N , L), for every component T ∈
C(N ) in (N , L) we have
∑
i∈T
ϕσi (v, L) =
∑
i∈T
h p(σ )i (N , v
L) =
∑
i∈T
∑
S⊆N ,i∈S
pSi (σ )vL (S)
=
∑
i∈T
∑
S⊆T,i∈S
pSi (σ )vL (S) =
∑
S⊆T
∑
i∈S
pSi (σ )vL (S)
=
∑
S⊆T
vL (S) = vL(T ),
showing that ϕσ satisfies component efficiency. For all v,w ∈ GN and all L ∈ LN ,
(v + w)L(S) =
∑
T ∈C(S)
(v + w)(T ) =
∑
T∈C(S)
(v(T ) + w(T )) = vL(S) + wL(S)
and thus (v+w)L (S) = vL (S) + wL (S) for all S ⊆ N . Then
ϕσi (N , v + w, L) =
∑
S⊆N ,i∈S
pSi (σ )(v+w)L (S)
=
∑
S⊆N ,i∈S
pSi (σ )(vL (S) + wL (S)) = ϕσi (v, L) + ϕσi (w, L),
showing that ϕσ satisfies additivity. Finally, when (v, L) is point unanimous, then
vL = vL(N )u D(N ,L) and ϕσ is obtained by distributing the unique nonzero dividend
vL (D(N , L)) among the players in D(N , L) according to the σ -measure, showing
that ϕσ satisfies the σ -communication ability property. unionsq
Next we generalize the degree measure property.
σ -Measure property If (v, L) is link unanimous, then there is α ∈ IR such that
f (v, L) = ασ(N , L).
Observe that the σ -measure property yields the degree measure property when we take
σ = d. The next lemma implies that the σ -measure property and the σ -communication
ability property are related.
Lemma 3.5
(i) Let (v, L) be a graph game. If (v, L) is link unanimous, then (v, L) is also point
unanimous.
(ii) Let (v, L) be a cycle-free graph game. Then (v, L) is link unanimous if and only
if (v, L) is point unanimous.
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Proof (i) If D(N , L) = ∅, then L = ∅ implying that vL(S) = 0 for all S ⊆ N , and
thus (i) holds. Next, suppose D(N , L) = ∅. By definition of link unanimity,
r L = vL(N )uL and thus vL\l(N ) = r L(L\l) = 0 for all l ∈ L . For S ⊆ N ,
we distinguish two cases.
1. For S such that D(N , L) ⊆ S, denote by C ′(N ) the set of components in
(N , L(S)). Then
vL(S)(N ) =
∑
T ∈C ′(N )
v(T ) =
∑
T∈C ′(S)
v(T ) +
∑
i∈N\S
v({i})
= vL(S)(S) = vL(S),
where the second equality follows from the fact that all nodes outside S
are singletons in the set of components in (N , L(S)), and the third equal-
ity follows from v being zero-normalized. From r L = vL(N )uL it further
follows that vL(S)(N ) = 0 since L(S) is a proper subset of L . Hence
vL(S) = vL(S)(N ) = 0. (3.1)
2. For S such that D(N , L) ⊆ S, by definition of vL ,
vL(S) =
∑
T∈C(S)
v(T ) =
∑
T∈C(S),|T |=1
v(T )
+
∑
T ∈C(S),|T |≥2
v(T ) =
∑
T∈C(S),|T |≥2
v(T )
=
∑
T∈C(S),T ⊆D(N ,L)
v(T ) =
∑
T∈C(N ),|T |≥2
v(T ) = vL(N ). (3.2)
From Eqs. 3.1 and 3.2 it follows that vL = vL(N )u D(N ,L), which proves (i).
(ii) The ‘only if’ part follows from (i). To prove the ‘if’ part, note that if we delete
a link l in a cycle-free graph (N , L), then the set D(N , L) is not connected in
(N , L\l). Thus, if vL = vL(N )u D(N ,L), then r L(L) = vL(N ) and r L(E) =
vE (N ) = 0 for all E ⊂ L , implying that r L = vL(N )uL . unionsq
Part (i) of the lemma implies that for general graph games the σ -communication
ability property implies the σ -measure property. Part (ii) of the lemma implies that
on the class of cycle-free graph games the two properties are equivalent. The next
corollary follows immediately from Proposition 3.4 and Lemma 3.5.
Corollary 3.6 For a positive power measure σ , the Harsanyi power solution ϕσ sat-
isfies the σ -measure property on the class of all graph games.
On the class of cycle-free graph games we further have the next lemma.
Lemma 3.7 For a positive power measure σ , the Harsanyi power solution ϕσ satisfies
the superfluous link property on the class of cycle-free graph games.
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Proof Recall that link l ∈ L is superfluous if vE (N ) = vE∪l(N ) for all E ⊆ L . Since
it is assumed that any game is zero-normalized, it follows straightforwardly from the
definition of the restricted game that this condition holds if and only if vL = vL\l .
Hence, when l is superfluous,
vL (S) = vL\l (S), S ∈ N .
When l ⊆ S, then (L\l)(S) = L(S) and so σi (S, L(S)) = σi (S, (L\l)(S)) for all
i ∈ S, implying that the share of i ∈ S in vL (S) is equal to the share of i in
vL\l (S). When l ⊆ S, we have that vL\l (S) = 0 because (N , L) is cycle-free. So,
vL (S) = vL\l (S) = 0 and the shares don’t matter. Hence
ϕσ (v, L) = ϕσ (v, L\l),
showing that ϕσ satisfies the superfluous link property on the class of cycle-free graph
games. unionsq
From Proposition 3.4, Corollary 3.6 and Lemma 3.7, it follows that ϕd satisfies
component efficiency, additivity, the degree measure property and the superfluous
link property on the class of cycle-free graph games. From Proposition 2.1.(i) we have
that on the class of cycle-free graph games the position value is characterized by these
four properties. Therefore, on this class the Harsanyi degree solution is equal to the
position value.
Corollary 3.8 If L ∈ LNC F then ϕd(v, L) = π(v, L) for any v ∈ GN .
The corollary shows that to define and compute the position value for cycle-free graph
games we do not need to introduce the link game as done in Borm et al. (1992), since
it is a Harsanyi solution applied to the restricted game vL . However, for arbitrary
graph games the position value is not equal to ϕd and the characterization in Borm
et al. (1992) does not work either. Clearly, since the degree measure is symmetric, by
Proposition 3.3 it follows that ϕd yields the Shapley value if (N , L) is the complete
graph. It is well-known that the position value does not generalize the Shapley value,
i.e., in general π(v, Lc) is not equal to Sh(v). In fact, the position value even may give
a payoff vector outside the Harsanyi set of the corresponding restricted game. The
Harsanyi set or Selectope of a game v, independently introduced by Vasil’ev (1978),
and Hammer et al. (1977), respectively (see also Vasil’ev and van der Laan 2002 and
Derks et al. 2000), is the set H(v) = {h p(v)|p ∈ P N } of all Harsanyi payoff vectors
of that game.8
Proposition 3.9 Let L ∈ LN . Then π(v, L) ∈ H(vL) for all v ∈ GN if and only if
L ∈ LNC F .
8 Although a Harsanyi solution selects for any game the payoff vector in the Harsanyi set corresponding
to a fixed sharing system, a solution that always selects a payoff vector from the Harsanyi set need not be
a Harsanyi solution, since for different games it might need different sharing systems to obtain a Harsanyi
payoff vector.
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Proof The ‘if’ part follows from Corollary 3.8 and the fact that by definition ϕd(v, L)
is a Harsanyi payoff vector of the game vL for any L ∈ LN . To prove the ‘only if’
part, suppose that L ∈ LN \LNC F . Then (N , L) contains a cycle, say (i1, . . . , ik, ik+1),
for some k ≥ 3. Take v = u{i1,i2} being the unanimity game of two neighboring
nodes in the cycle. Since {i1, i2} ∈ L , we have that vL = v = u{i1,i2}, and thus all
i ∈ N\{i1, i2} are null players in vL , i.e., vL(S) = vL(S\{i}) for all i ∈ N\{i1, i2}.
Since null players earn a zero payoff in any Harsanyi payoff vector we have
xi = 0 for all x ∈ H(vL) and i ∈ N\{i1, i2}. (3.3)
However, since (i1, . . . , ik+1) is a cycle we have that r L(E) − r L(E\{i2, i3}) = 1 for
E = {{i j , i j+1} | j = 2, . . . , k}. Hence the link {i2, i3} is not a null player in the
link game (L , r L). Moreover, since v = u{i1,i2} is monotone, it follows that also r L is
monotone, and thus the Shapley value of the link game satisfies Sh{i2,i3}(L , r L) > 0
and Shl(L , r L) ≥ 0 for all l ∈ L . But then πi3(v, L) ≥ 12 Sh{i2,i3}(L , r L) > 0. With
(3.3) it then follows that π(v, L) ∈ H(vL). unionsq
4 Axiomatizations of Harsanyi power solutions
In this section we give axiomatic characterizations of Harsanyi power solutions, first
for the subclass of cycle-free graph games and subsequently for general graph games.
4.1 Axiomatization on the class of cycle-free graph games
According to statement (i) of Proposition 2.1 and Corollary 3.8, on the class of
cycle-free graph games the Harsanyi power solution with σ = d is the unique solu-
tion satisfying component efficiency, additivity, the superfluous link property and the
degree-measure property. The next proposition generalizes this result to general pos-
itive power measures.
Proposition 4.1 Let σ be a positive power measure. Then on the class of cycle-free
graph games the Harsanyi power solution ϕσ is the unique solution satisfying compo-
nent efficiency, additivity, the superfluous link property and the σ -measure property.
Proof According to Proposition 3.4, Corollary 3.6 and Lemma 3.7 the Harsanyi power
solution ϕσ satisfies the four properties on the class of cycle-free graph games. Unique-
ness follows along similar lines as the uniqueness proof for the position value in
Borm et al. (1992). Here we give a brief outline. Consider graph game (cuT , L), c ∈
IR, T ∈ N , with L cycle-free. If there is no component S in (N , L) such that
T ⊆ S then all links are superfluous, and the superfluous link property implies that
f (cuT , L) = f (cuT , L∅) with L∅ = ∅. Component efficiency uniquely determines
f (cuT , L∅). On the other hand, if there is a component S in (N , L) such that T ⊆ S
then all links outside the connected hull H(T ) = {h ∈ N | there exist i, j ∈ T
such that h belongs to the path between i and j} of T are superfluous, and thus the
superfluous link property implies that f (cuT , L) = f (cuT , L(H(T ))). (Note that in
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a cycle-free graph there is exactly one path between any pair of connected nodes.)
Since (cuT , L(H(T ))) is link unanimous, the σ − measure property and component
efficiency uniquely determine f (cuT , L(H(T ))). Finally, for arbitrary v ∈ GN unique-
ness follows from additivity. unionsq
Logical independence of the axioms in Proposition 4.1 is shown in the appendix.
In this axiomatization, component efficiency works similarly as efficiency for TU-
games, component efficiency with the superfluous link property work similarly as
the null player property, and additivity for graph games works similarly as additiv-
ity for TU-games. The σ -measure property replaces the symmetry axiom. Although
symmetry seems reasonable for TU-games, it does not for graph-games because of
the asymmetric positions of players in the communication graph, even when they are
symmetric in the game. The σ -measure property is the only axiom in Proposition 4.1
where the power measure σ appears, and it shows how symmetry can be replaced by an
axiom that takes account of the power measures of the players in the communication
graph.
Recall from the previous section that the σ -degree measure property and the
σ -communication ability property are equivalent to each other on the class of cycle-
free graph games. So, in Proposition 4.1 we can replace the σ -measure property by
the σ -communication ability property. This gives the following corollary (the logical
independence of the axioms is again shown in the appendix.)
Corollary 4.2 Let σ be a positive power measure. Then on the class of cycle-free
graph games the Harsanyi power solution ϕσ is the unique solution satisfying com-
ponent efficiency, additivity, the superfluous link property and the σ -communication
ability property.
Proposition 4.1 generalizes the characterization of the position value on the class of
cycle-free graphs using the degree measure property, see Proposition 2.1.(i), to the
characterization of the Harsanyi power solution for any positive power measure. Tak-
ing the equal power measure γ , we then obtain a characterization of the Myerson value
using the equal power measure property as an alternative for the characterization of the
Myerson value by using the communication ability property, see Proposition 2.1.(ii).
On the other hand, on the class of cycle-free graph games by Corollary 4.2 the position
value also can be characterized using some σ -communication ability property, namely
the degree-communication ability property. This gives the following corollary, being
the counterpart of the two statements of Proposition 2.1.
Corollary 4.3 (i) On the class of cycle-free graph games, the position value is the
unique solution satisfying component efficiency, additivity, the superfluous link
property, and the degree-communication ability property.
(ii) On the class of cycle-free graph games, the Myerson value is the unique solu-
tion satisfying component efficiency, additivity, the superfluous link property,
and the equal power measure property.
In Borm et al. (1992) the position value is characterized by using the degree mea-
sure property and the Myerson value by using the communication ability property.
Here we have generalized both characterizations so that they both include character-
izations of the position value and the Myerson value, taking the appropriate power
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measure. So, the view that the difference between the position value and Myerson
value (on cycle-free graph games) is about using the degree measure property (which
is defined using link unanimous graph games) or the communication ability property
(which is defined using point unanimous graph games) has to be reconsidered. Both
values satisfy a σ -measure property and a σ -communication ability property, but the
difference is with respect to which power measure σ to use, the degree measure or the
equal power measure.
4.2 Axiomatization on the class of all graph games
In Proposition 3.4 we saw that on the class of all graph games the Harsanyi power
solutions satisfy component efficiency, additivity and the σ -communication ability
property. On the class of cycle-free graph games these solutions also satisfy the super-
fluous link property, see Lemma 3.7. However, this property does not hold on the
class of all graph games (see Example 5.4 on assignment games). To characterize the
Harsanyi power solutions on the class of all graph games we replace the superfluous
link property by the following two invariance properties.
Inessential link property When T ⊆ N is a connected nonempty coalition, v =
cuT , c ∈ IR, and l ∈ L contains a player not in T , then f (v, L) = f (v, L\l).
Connectedness When vL = wL , then f (v, L) = f (w, L).
The inessential link property states that when v is a unanimity game on a connected
nonempty coalition T , then the solution does not depend on links containing at least
one player not in T . Such links are called inessential in that unanimity graph game.
The connectedness property states that the solution only depends on the worths of
the connected coalitions. The following proposition characterizes the Harsanyi power
solutions on the class of all graph games.
Proposition 4.4 Let σ be a positive power measure. On the class of all graph games,
the Harsanyi power solution ϕσ is the unique solution satisfying component efficiency,
additivity, the σ -communication ability property, the inessential link property and con-
nectedness.
Proof From Proposition 3.4 we know that ϕσ satisfies the first three properties. Recall
that for L ∈ LN , L(T ) = {l ∈ L|l ⊆ T } is the set of links between players in T . To
show that ϕσ satisfies the inessential link property, consider v = cuT for some non-
empty connected T, c ∈ IR and l ⊆ T . Then, vL (T ) = vL\l (T ) = c and vL (S) =
vL\l (S) = 0 for any S = T . Moreover, for every l ⊆ T, (T, L(T )) = (T, (L\l)(T )),
and so σi (T, L(T )) = σi (T, (L\l)(T )) for all i ∈ T . Hence, for v = cuT and l ⊆ T
we have
ϕσ (v, L) = ϕσ (v, L\l),
which proves the inessential link property. The connectedness property follows
straightforwardly from the fact that vL (S) = wL (S) for all S when vL = wL .
To prove uniqueness, we first consider v = cuT for some c ∈ IR and T ∈ N . We
distinguish two cases.
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1. Let T be connected in (N , L). Then (cuT )L = cuT . From the inessential link prop-
erty, f (cuT , L) = f (cuT , L(T )). Since (cuT , L(T )) is a point unanimous graph
game, the σ − communication abili t y property implies that f (cuT , L) =
f (cuT , L(T )) = ασ(N , L(T )) for some α ∈ IR. Component efficiency then
determines α.
2. Suppose that T is not connected in (N , L). Let T be a collection of connected
subsets of N that contain T , and let δS, S ∈ T , be numbers such that (cuT )L =∑
S∈T δSuS (see Hamiache 1999 for the existence of such a T and numbers δS).
Since all S ∈ T are connected in (N , L), we know from case 1 that f (δSuS, L) =
f (δSuS, L(S)) is uniquely determined for every S ∈ T . By additivity we then
have that f (cuT , L) = ∑S∈T f (δSuS, L(S)) is uniquely determined.
It further follows that additivity uniquely determines f (v, L) = ∑T∈N f (v(T )
uT , L) for any graph game (v, L). unionsq
Logical independence of the axioms in Proposition 4.4 is again shown in the appen-
dix. Note that in the proof of this proposition we used that a graph game (uT , L(T ))
is point unanimous if T is connected. However, such a graph game is not necessar-
ily link unanimous (as can be seen from the graph game (v, L) on N = {1, 2, 3}
with v = u{1,2,3} and L = {{1, 2}, {1, 3}, {2, 3}}, which is point unanimous but
not link unanimous). Consequently, the σ -measure property does not imply the
σ -communication ability property (while it follows from Lemma 3.5.(i) that the impli-
cation holds the other way around).
5 Applications
5.1 Assignment games
The assignment game, introduced by Shapley and Shubik (1972), is a game in which
the player set N is partitioned in two sets, say the set V of sellers and the set W of
buyers. Any pair {i, j}, i ∈ V, j ∈ W , can realise a nonnegative surplus ai, j from
trade. However, any seller i ∈ V can trade with only one buyer j ∈ W , and the other
way around. A matching on a subset S ⊆ N of players is a collection M of subsets
{i, j} ⊆ S, i ∈ V, j ∈ W , such that for any i ∈ V, |{{h, j} ∈ M |h = i}| ≤ 1 and
for any j ∈ W, |{{i, h} ∈ M |h = j}| ≤ 1. For S ⊆ N , let M(S) be the set of all
matchings on S. Then the maximum surplus that can be obtained by a coalition S ⊆ N
is given by
v(S) = max
M∈M(S)
∑
{i, j}∈M
ai, j
with v(S) = 0 when M(S) = ∅, i.e., when S ⊆ V or S ⊆ W .
We now consider the communication graph on N in which the links reflect all
matching possibilities, so the graph on N is the bipartite graph (N , L) with {i, j} ∈ L
if and only if i ∈ V and j ∈ W . For this graph (N , L) we have that vL = v and
therefore we denote also the restricted game by v. Since any coalition only containing
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either sellers or buyers is unconnected, it follows that v(S) = 0 if S ⊆ V or S ⊆ W .
For all connected coalitions the dividends are given by
v(S) =
∑
{T⊆S| min(|T∩V |, |T∩W |)≥1}
(−1)|S|−|T |v(T ).
Example 5.1 Consider the assignment game with one seller V = {1}, two buyers
W = {2, 3} and with a1,2 = 1, a1,3 = 2. Then L = {{1, 2}, {1, 3}} and v is given by
v(S) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
1 if S = {1, 2},
2 if S ∈ {{1, 3}, {1, 2, 3}},
0 otherwise.
The dividends are
v(S) =
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
1 if S = {1, 2},
2 if S = {1, 3},
−1 if S = {1, 2, 3},
0 otherwise.
The degree measures on the subgraphs of the coalitions with nonzero divi-
dends are d1({1, 2}, L({1, 2})) = d2({1, 2}, L({1, 2})) = d1({1, 3}, L({1, 3})) =
d3({1, 3}, L({1, 3})) = d2(N , L) = d3(N , L) = 1 and d1(N , L) = 2. This gives the
Harsanyi degree solution payoffs ϕd(v, L) = (1, 14 , 34 ). Since, the graph is cycle-free,
these payoffs are equal to the position value payoffs of (v, L).
As an alternative solution, the β-measure yields β1({1, 2}, L({1, 2})) = β2({1, 2},
L({1, 2})) = β1({1, 3}, L({1, 3})) = β3({1, 3}, L({1, 3})) = 1, β1(N , L) = 2 and
β2(N , L) = β3(N , L) = 12 . The resulting Harsanyi power solution yields payoffs
ϕβ(v, L) = ( 56 , 13 , 56 ).
Example 5.2 Consider the assignment game with V = {1, 2}, W ={3, 4} and a1,3=1,
a1,4 = 3, a2,3 = 4 and a2,4 = 5. Then L = {{1, 3}, {1, 4}, {2, 3}, {2, 4}} and the non-
zero dividends of vL = v are given by
v(S) =
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
ai, j if S = {i, j}, i ∈ V, j ∈ W,
− min[a1, j , a2, j ] if S = {1, 2, j}, j ∈ W,
− min[ai,3, ai,4] if S = {i, 3, 4}, i ∈ V,
3 if S = V ∪ W.
For these coalitions the degree measures on the subgraphs are di (S, L(S))=d j (S, L(S))
= 1 if S = {i, j}, i ∈ V, j ∈ W, d1(S, L(S)) = d2(S, L(S)) = 12 d j (S, L(S)) = 1
if S = {1, 2, j} with j ∈ W, d3(S, L(S)) = d4(S, L(S)) = 12 di (S, L(S)) = 1 if
S = {i, 3, 4} with i ∈ V , and di (N , L) = d j (N , L) = 2 for i ∈ V, j ∈ W if
N = V ∪ W . Distributing the dividends according to the degrees, we obtain the
Harsanyi degree solution payoffs ϕd(v, L) = ( 54 , 94 , 32 , 2).
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In this case the graph is not cycle-free and the Harsanyi degree solution is not equal to
the position value. It follows that the Shapley value of the link game (L , r L ) is given by
Sh{1,3}(L , r L) = 13 , Sh{1,4}(L , r L) = 2, Sh{2,3}(L , r L) = 52 and Sh{2,4}(L , r L) = 136 .
This yields the position value π(v, L) = ( 76 , 73 , 1712 , 2512 ). unionsq
Although Example 5.2 shows that in the assignment game the position value is not
equal to the Harsanyi degree solution, in both solutions the total payoff to the sellers is
equal to the total payoff to the buyers. Clearly, in the communication graph as defined
above each link is between a seller and a buyer. So, the position value is obtained by
distributing the Shapley payoff of each link in the link game equally between a seller
and a buyer. For the Harsanyi degree solution we have that in each connected coalition
the sum of the degrees of the sellers is equal to the sum of the degrees of the buyers,
so any dividend is equally shared between sellers and buyers. Since both solutions are
component efficient, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 5.3 Let v be an assignment game on the player set N = V ∪ W , and let
(N , L) be the corresponding bipartite graph with L = {{i, j}|i ∈ V, j ∈ W }. Then
∑
i∈V
ϕdi (v, L) =
∑
j∈W
ϕdj (v, L) =
∑
i∈V
πi (v, L) =
∑
j∈W
π j (v, L) = 12v(N ).
Moreover, ϕd(v, L) = π(v, L) if |V | = 1 or |W | = 1.
The next example shows that the Harsanyi degree solution does not satisfy the super-
fluous link property when the graph is not cycle-free.
Example 5.4 Consider the assignment game given in Example 5.1 and suppose now
that also the two buyers 2 and 3 can communicate, i.e., the communication graph is
given by Lc = {{1, 2}, {1, 3}, {2, 3}} = L ∪ {{2, 3}} with L the graph in Example
5.1. Clearly vE (N ) = vE∪{2,3}(N ) for all E ⊂ Lc, so {2, 3} is superfluous in Lc.
Hence, according to the superfluous link property we have that π(v, Lc) = π(v, L) =
(1, 14 ,
3
4 ). However, when distributing the dividends according to the degree measure,
each player has degree 2 in the grand coalition N , so the Harsanyi degree solution
yields ϕd(v, Lc) = ( 76 , 16 , 46 ) (being the Shapley value of v), which is not equal to
ϕd(v, L). The communication possibility between the two buyers decreases their pay-
offs. It shows that communication might be harmful, because it may give larger shares
in negative dividends. unionsq
We end this subsection by considering the case that buyers and sellers cannot trade
directly with each other, but need intermediaries. Then the set N is partitioned in a set
V of sellers, a set W of buyers and a set I of intermediaries, and the communication
graph on N is the graph (N , L) in which every intermediary is connected to every
buyer and seller, i.e., L = {{i, j} | i ∈ I, j ∈ V ∪ W }. Again vL = v.
Example 5.5 Extend Example 5.1 with a single intermediary player, labeled 4. So
I = {4} and L = {{i, 4} | i = 1, 2, 3}. Now the game v follows from the assignment
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game in Example 5.1 but with player 4 being necessary to obtain a positive worth, and
thus is given by
v(S) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
1 if S = {1, 2, 4},
2 if S ∈ {{1, 3, 4}, {1, 2, 3, 4}},
0 otherwise,
with dividends
v(S) =
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
1 if S = {1, 2, 4},
2 if S = {1, 3, 4},
−1 if S = {1, 2, 3, 4},
0 otherwise.
For any coalition S with nonzero dividend, the degree of i in (S, L(S)) is 1 if i = 4,
while the degree of player 4 is equal to |S| − 1. From this it follows that the Harsanyi
degree solution yields ϕd(v, L) = ( 712 , 112 , 412 , 1). Since, the graph is cycle-free, this
solution is equal to the position value. unionsq
Observe that the graph (N , L) is not cycle-free when |I | ≥ 2, and thus the position
value differs from the Harsanyi degree solution when there are multiple intermediar-
ies. However, also if |I | ≥ 2, any link in the graph connects one of the intermediaries
with either a buyer or a seller. So, in both the position value and the Harsanyi degree
solution the total payoff to the intermediaries is equal to the total payoff to the sellers
and the buyers together. Since both solutions are component efficient, we have the
following corollary.
Corollary 5.6 Let v be an assignment game with intermediaries on N = V ∪ W ∪ I ,
and let (N , L) be the corresponding graph with L = {{i, j} | i ∈ I, j ∈ V ∪ W }.
Then
∑
i∈I
ϕdi (v, L) =
∑
j∈V∪W
ϕdj (v, L) =
∑
i∈I
πi (v, L) =
∑
j∈V∪W
π j (v, L) = 12v(N ).
Moreover, ϕd(v, L) = π(v, L) if |I | = 1.
5.2 ATM games
In this subsection we consider ATM games as introduced in Bjorndal et al. (2004). An
ATM-game models a situation of n banks on a single location, where some banks have
an Automated Teller Machine (money dispenser) and others do not. The banks may
agree to cooperate, meaning that customers of banks not having an ATM are allowed
to make use of the ATMs of the other banks, resulting in cost savings because using
ATMs is a relatively cheap way of cash withdrawals.
We first consider a situation when there is only one single bank having an ATM.
Specifically, let the banks not having an ATM be indexed by i = 2, . . . , n and let player
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1 be the only bank that has an ATM. The number of visits of customers of bank i = 1
to the ATM of bank 1 is given by ωi . We assume that each visit yields a cost saving
of one. So, coalition S = {1, i} can realize the non-negative worth ωi , i = 2, . . . , n
and thus the corresponding game is given by
v (S) =
{ ∑
i∈S\{1}
ωi , if 1 ∈ S,
0, otherwise.
It follows straightforwardly that
v(S) =
{
ωi , if S = {1, i}, i = 2, . . . , m,
0, otherwise.
From van den Nouweland et al. (1996) (Theorem 4.3) we know that when only two-
player coalitions have nonzero dividends, the Shapley value Sh coincides with the
τ -value (see Tijs 1981) and the nucleolus η (see Schmeidler 1969). We now model
the ATM game as a graph game with (N , L) the star graph given by L = {{1, i} |
i = 2, . . . , n}, i.e., the single ATM bank is linked with any other bank. Since only
the two-player coalitions {1, i}, i = 1, have nonzero dividends, it follows again that
vL = v. Further, in any subgraph on a two-player coalition {1, i}, i = 1, both players
have degree one and also both players have equal β-power. Therefore, the Harsanyi
degree solution, the Harsanyi β-measure solution, the Shapley value and the Myerson
value coincide. Since the graph is cycle-free, we also have that the position value
equals this solution. Hence
π(v, L) = ϕd(v, L) = ϕβ(v, L) = μ(v, L) = Sh(v) = τ(v) = η(v).
In all these solutions the payoff to the ATM bank 1 is
∑n
i=2 12ωi and the payoff to bank
i is 12ωi , i = 2, . . . , n. Thus, all these solutions satisfy the equal split property (see
Bjorndal et al. 2004) meaning that the cost savings ωi obtained from the cooperation
between bank i = 1, and ATM bank 1 is equally distributed between these two banks.
Finally, because all dividends are nonnegative, this payoff vector also belongs to the
core of the game.
Next we consider the case when there are multiple banks having an ATM, but there
is only one bank without an ATM. Let {1, . . . , n − 1} be the set of banks who possess
ATMs and let bank n be the bank without ATM. The value of any coalition containing
bank n and at least one other bank equals the total number of customers ωn of bank
n. So, the game is given by
v (S) =
{
ωn, if n ∈ S and |S| ≥ 2,
0, otherwise.
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It follows that the dividends are given by
v(S) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
ωn, if n ∈ S and |S| ≥ 2 is even,
−ωn, if n ∈ S and |S| ≥ 2 is odd,
0, if S ⊆ N\{n}.
Note that this ATM game is equivalent to the assignment game with n − 1 sellers
(the banks with ATMs) and one buyer (bank n without ATM), which can realise
the surplus ωn with anyone of the sellers. Taking (N , L) as the star graph given by
L = {{i, n})|i = 1, . . . , n − 1}, again vL = v. Since (N , L) is cycle-free, it follows
that the Harsanyi degree solution is equal to the position value. Furthermore, from
Corollary 5.3 it follows that the payoff to player n according to these solutions is
given by
πn(v, L) = ϕdn (v, L) =
ωn
2
.
Hence, by symmetry and component efficiency of ϕd and π it follows that
πi (v, L) = ϕdi (v, L)) =
ωn
2(n − 1) , i = 1, . . . , n − 1.
It is instructive to find out what distribution of the total value ωn other solution con-
cepts prescribe. The marginal contribution of player n is ωn in any permutation except
those (n − 1)! ones where he enters first. Hence,
Shn(v) = n! − (n − 1)!
n! ωn =
n − 1
n
ωn
and, by symmetry and efficiency of the Shapley value, we obtain Shi (v) = 1n(n−1)ωn
for all i = n. The Myerson value μ(v, L) is equal to Sh(v). Further, for n ≥ 3 it
has been shown in Bjorndal et al. (2004) that τ(v) = η(v) = x∗ with x∗ the single
element in the core of the game given by x∗n = ωn and x∗i = 0, i = n. Summarizing
these observations, we obtain the following relations (in case n ≥ 3)
ωn = τn(v) = ηn(v) > Shn(v) = μn(v, L) > ϕdn (v, L),
0 = τi (v) = ηi (v) < Shi (v) = μi (v, L) < ϕdi (v, L)
= πi (v, L), i ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1}.
The Harsanyi degree solution shares the cost savings equally between the banks with
ATMs and the single bank without ATM, whereas the τ -value and the nucleolus assign
all the value to the bank without ATM, implying that this bank can use the money dis-
pensers of the other banks for free. The Shapley value is between the nucleolus and
the Harsanyi degree solution, converging to the former when n goes to infinity.
In Bjorndal et al. (2004) a single solution concept is proposed for both situations
with one bank with ATM and situations with a single bank without ATM. They call
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this solution the aggregate allocation solution. This solution is given by the nucleolus
which in case of a single ATM shares the surplus equally, but it gives all the surplus to
the bank without ATM in case of a single bank without ATM. In contrast, the analysis
above shows that the Harsanyi degree solution yields an equal split in both situations.
In reality, banks cooperate using each other’s ATM’s by agreeing on a fee to be paid
by the bank without ATM for each withdrawal of one of its customers at an ATM
bank. Typically this fee is uniform and does not depend on whether or not there is a
single ATM. When the fee is taken to be half of the cost savings, the Harsanyi degree
solution yields the resulting payoffs in case of a single ATM. In case of multiple ATMs,
the Harsanyi degree solution gives the expected payoff to the ATM-banks when the
customers of bank n choose randomly between the available ATMs.
5.3 Auction games
Consider a second-price sealed bid auction with n bidders. Suppose that their private
valuations are arranged in a non-increasing order θ1 ≥ θ2 ≥ · · · ≥ θn−1 ≥ θn > 0, and
let us assume that the seller attaches utility θn+1 ∈ [0, θn) to the object which serves
as a reservation price. If all n bidders collude and reveal their private valuations,9 they
can earn as mush as θ1 − θn+1. How should they share this surplus?
This can be modeled as a TU-game v in wich any coalition not including player 1
(player with the highest private valuation) generates zero worth and for any coalition S
that includes player 1 the worth is equal to θ1−θk+1, where k+1 = min{ j ∈ N | j /∈ S}.
Taking the line-graph L = {{i, i + 1} | i ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1}} as the communication
graph, the worth of S including player 1 is determined by its largest connected part
[1, k], where [i, j] = {i, i + 1, . . . , j − 1, j} denotes the coalition of consecutive
players from i to j . From van den Brink et al. (2007) [Formula (8)], it follows that
v(S) =
{
θk − θk+1, if S = [1, k] ,
0, otherwise.
For any connected coalition S = [i, j] in a line-graph, the degree measure is given by
dk (S, L (S)) =
{
1, if k ∈ {i, j}
2, if k ∈ S\{i, j}.
From this it follows that the Harsanyi degree solution is given by
ϕd1 (v, L) = v({1}) +
1
2
n∑
k=2
v([1, k])
k − 1 = (θ1 − θ2) +
1
2
(
n∑
k=2
θk − θk+1
k − 1
)
,
9 In second-price auctions collusion is supported by Graham and Marshall (1987) who provide a simple
incentive-compatible mechanism that induces bidders to disclose their private information about valuations
and fosters collusive behavior in such auctions.
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ϕdi (v, L) =
1
2 (i − 1)v([1, i]) +
n∑
k=i+1
v([1, k])
k − 1 =
θi − θi+1
2 (i − 1) +
n∑
k=i+1
θk − θk+1
k − 1
for any i ∈ {2, . . . , n − 1}, and
ϕdn (v, L) =
1
2 (n − 1)v([1, n]) =
θn − θn+1
2 (n − 1) .
Since the graph is cycle-free this solution coincides with the position value. The
Shapley value, proposed for this type of games in Graham et al. (1990), is given by
Shi (v) = ∑nk=i v([1,k])k . It is easily shown that if n ≥ 3, Sh1(v) > ϕd1 (v, L), and
Shn(v) > ϕdn (v, L) for the bidder with the lowest valuation. Thus, the Harsanyi degree
solution gives more to ‘central’ players at the expense of the ‘end’ ones.
6 Concluding remarks
In this paper we studied Harsanyi power solutions for TU-games in which the coop-
eration possibilities are restricted by a communication graph. In such solutions the
sharing system that is used in distributing the Harsanyi dividends in the restricted
game is determined by a power measure for communication graphs. Although any
positive power measure can be applied, we gave special attention to the degree mea-
sure and the equal power measure. On the class of cycle-free graph games, the Harsanyi
degree solution is equal to the position value, while it equals the Shapley value on the
class of complete graph games. The Harsanyi equal power solution is always equal to
the Myerson value.
We gave two axiomatic characterizations of the Harsanyi power solutions on the
class of cycle-free graph games. One axiomatization uses the σ -measure property,
and the other uses the σ -communication ability property. Both give characterizations
for the position value and the Myerson value as special cases.10 So, the difference
between the position value and the Myerson value (on cycle-free graph games) is not
about using the degree measure property or the communication ability property, but
about which power measure to use. In fact, on the class of cycle-free graph games
these two properties are equivalent given the same power measure. This is not the case
for the class of all graph games where the σ -communication ability property implies
the σ -measure property. On the class of all graph games the Harsanyi power solutions
satisfy all properties used in these characterizations for cycle-free graph games except
the superfluous link property. Replacing this property by two invariance properties,
we gave an axiomatic characterization for the Harsanyi power solutions on the class
of all graph games using the σ -communication ability property.
We also applied Harsanyi power solutions to some specific classes of games, in
particular to assignment games, ATM games and auction games. Finally, we mention
that the results of this paper can be restated for antisymmetric directed graphs.
10 Recently another approach unifying the Myerson value and the Shapley value has been given in Gómez
et al. (2004).
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Appendix: Logical independence
In this appendix we show the logical independence of the axioms in the various char-
acterizations. First we consider the characterization of the Harsanyi power solution on
the class of cycle-free graph games given in Proposition 4.1. Each of the next four solu-
tions satisfies three of the four axioms, but differs from the Harsanyi power solution.
1. Let solution f 1 be given by f 1i (v, L) = 0 for all i ∈ N . Then f 1 satisfies addi-
tivity, the superfluous link property and the σ -measure property (take α = 0), but
f 1 does not satisfy component efficiency.
2. For any cycle-free graph game (v, L), let Ls ⊆ L be the set of links that are not
superfluous in (v, L). Let f 2 be given by f 2(v, L) = hσ(N ,Ls )(vLs ), i.e., the divi-
dends in the restricted game on the graph (N , Ls) are allocated proportional to the
σ -measure on (N , Ls). Then f 2 satisfies component efficiency, the superfluous
link property and the σ -measure property, but it does not satisfy additivity.
3. Let f 3 be given by f 3(v, L) = hσ(N ,L)(vL), i.e., the dividend of coalition S in
the restricted game is allocated proportional to the σ -measures of the players in S
in the graph (N , L) (instead of their powers on the subgraph (S, L(S))). Then f 3
satisfies component efficiency, additivity, and the σ -measure property, but it does
not satisfy the superfluous link property.
4. For any power measure σ = ασ for any α > 0, define f 4 as the Harsanyi power
solution with σ . Then f 4 satisfies component efficiency, additivity and the super-
fluous link property, but does not satisfy the σ -measure property.
Since for cycle-free graphs, the σ -communication ability property is equiva-
lent with the σ -measure property, the same four solutions also show the logical
independence of the axioms in Corollary 4.2.
It remains to consider the logical independence of the five axioms used in Prop-
osition 4.4 to characterize the Harsanyi power solution on the class of all graph
games. On that class each of the solutions f 1, f 3 and f 4 defined above satisfies
the five axioms of Proposition 4.4, except component efficiency, the inessential
link property and the σ -communication ability property, respectively. It remains
to consider the other two axioms.
5. On the class of all graph games, let f 5 be defined similarly as f 2, but now by
deleting links such that all coalitions containing such a link has zero dividend, i.e.,
f 5(v, L) = hσ(N ,Le)(vLe ) with Le = {l ∈ L | there is an S ⊆ N with l ⊆ S and
v(S) = 0}. This solution satisfies all five axioms, except additivity.
6. Let f 6 be defined by f 6i (v, L) = σi (N ,L
e)∑
j∈Bi σ j (N ,L
e)
v(Bi ) with Bi being the com-
ponent in (N , Le) containing player i . Then f 6 satisfies all five axioms, except
connectedness.
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